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ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I address capital accumulation by means of analyzing one of this process’s most
economically successful administrative vehicles: the Luxembourg investment fund – which
hosts, at present, nearly $5 trillion in assets. In the 1950s, officials from foreign investment
companies came looking for an ultra-low-tax domicile from which to sell their “products.”
However, Luxembourg’s long-used H29 holding company – a structure designed to avoid double
(or any) taxation on the assets of rich foreign clients – would not work on its own as a vehicle for
investment funds. Thus, local attorneys began to alter the H29 in piecemeal fashion, with the
intention of creating a framework to facilitate capital accumulation via Luxembourgadministered funds. During the 1980s, amid Europe’s deepening market integration, a local
working group was charged with formulating an EEC-wide scheme, or “passport,” for
investment funds. In 1988, the Luxembourgish government swiftly implemented the first EEC
directive for investment funds into law. Today, this “industry” has long exceeded the level of
assets from before the 2008-09 global financial crisis. In this light, I predict that Luxembourg’s
fund administrators will have a hand in shaping future versions of global capitalism, complete
with the promise and misery they will no doubt engender.
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“Capital grows to a huge mass in a single hand in one place, because it has been lost by
many in another place.” – Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Chapter 25 (1992: p. 777)
In chapter 24 of Capital, Vol. III – in which Marx famously likens the ability of
“money to create value [to that] of a pear tree to bear pears” (1993: p. 516) – he discusses
the central role played by the accumulation of financial assets within the capitalist mode
of production. This tendency, perceptively noted by Marx in the early 1860s, has since
become a defining characteristic of contemporary capitalism – best seen in the current
proliferation of “investment funds,” or administrative vehicles ensuring capital
accumulation. Insofar as this process has been part of a longer-term trend, its result has
nonetheless entailed major structural changes in political economies worldwide.
As industrial bases in the Global North shrank throughout the 1970s, the
governing elites of these countries chose to swap an economic model based on
production for one premised instead on financial expansion, ushering in what Dörry has
called “securities capitalism” (2016: p. 22). Indeed, during the 1980s and 90s, growing
employment and profits in the FIRE sectors 1 ensured overall economic growth, even if
this took place in a deeply uneven fashion. The transition to a FIRE-led economy also
resulted in the owners of these new financial assets experiencing, inter alia, a “wealth
effect” from the accruing capital gains (Foster, 2010: pp. 11–12). While in absolute terms

much of this accumulation benefited only a small number of very rich asset holders, large
sections of the middle and upper-middle classes within the Global North also experienced
it via price inflation in housing and securities markets.
In this chapter, I seek to add to the growing body of literature in the social
sciences that documents the economic (see Ho, 2009; Lépinay, 2011), social (Harmes,
2001; Knorr Cetina and Preda, eds., 2012), legal (Riles, 2011), and political ramifications
(Harrington, 2016) of the post-1970s shift to securities capitalism. More specifically, I
will examine the development of one of contemporary capitalism’s most utilized
administrative vehicles ensuring financial accumulation: the Luxembourg investment
fund, in which is housed at present a staggering $4.7 trillion in accumulated assets
(Luxembourg Fund Industry, 2020). This eye-popping figure makes tiny Luxembourg the
world’s second-leading domicile jurisdiction for accumulating fund assets after the
United States – a country that is 550 times more populous than this Grand Duchy. 2
Before I place the Luxembourg investment fund into a historical context, however, I will
briefly outline how the “investment fund” more generally came to be such a significant
instrument of financial accumulation, currently home to some $90 trillion in assets
worldwide (Boston Consulting Group, 2020; see figure 1). Additionally, I will also show
how the activity predicated on this process has transformed the global economic order
since the 1970s.
<INSERT FIGURE ONE>
To aid my analysis, I draw inspiration from the approach of the “regulation
theorists” – a group of mostly French political economists working within, and alongside,
the Marxist and Durkheimian traditions from the 1970s onward. Propelled by the seminal
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texts of Aglietta (1976, 1998), Chesnais (2004), and others, the so-called “regulationists”
sought to explain one of capitalism’s trickiest of paradoxes: how capitalist economies are
able to preserve their processes of accumulation and reproduction amid all the social
contestation that arises from this mode of production. Having established this problematic
as a basis for analysis, the regulationists went on to assess in impressive detail the
institutions, procedures, calculations, and norms in countries such as France and the
United States that have enabled the accumulation of capital and thus its reproduction. It
should not come as a surprise, therefore, that finance became an area of particular
scrutiny and concern for the regulationists, who surveyed its activities both as a regime of
accumulation and a mode of regulation (Brenner and Glick, 1991). While the former
process prompted study of the economic and social factors assuring long-term capital
accumulation, the latter one steered them to analyze extant monetary and financial
regimes, including currency controls, systems for international payments, and securities
markets.
It is in this historical and conceptual nexus in which I situate my present analysis.
While later versions of “regulation theory” (see Chesnais, 2004) came to address the
increasingly globalized and deregulated versions of finance capitalism taking shape
during the 1980s and 90s, the classic scholarship from this tendency remained
preoccupied with the conjuncture of the post-1968 period and the 1970s – years marked
by growth deceleration, the fraying of the Fordist economic model, and the steel and oil
crises in the Global North. In this light, in order to analyze the Luxembourg investment
fund as an exemplary vehicle of contemporary accumulation processes, it is necessary to
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expand upon the impressive conceptual and historical apparatus that Aglietta and
colleagues have left for us.
Indeed, the late 1970s saw the consolidation of the post-Bretton Woods global
financial architecture, one characterized by floating exchange rates, free capital
movements, and market deregulation. By the 1990s and 2000s, the breakneck growth of
India and China, technologies such as the internet, and the surging concentrations of
income and wealth among the top percentiles in the advanced capitalist countries had
raised the demand for complex financial instruments. Investment funds – an umbrella
term that includes mutual and hedge funds, and funds investing in real estate and privateequity schemes – have become the preferred means by which individuals and institutions
can store and grow their accumulating assets without, of course, needing to assume a
management role. In this regard, Marx might cite the contemporary investment fund as a
“fetish of capital” par excellence, in which capital gains seemingly grow of their own
accord. Via investment funds, “investors” need not know who their debtors are or how
their returns are made; they “only want to know if the markets will remain liquid”
(Chesnais, 2004: p. 31; cited in Paulani, 2010: pp. 364–365).
As was detailed to me by a former senior Luxembourgish regulator, the
“investment fund” has become such a remarkable economic success because the idea
behind this financial product is simple and compelling: to diversify the assets in which
one can invest and accumulate the principal and returns (interview, March 2016). The
result is that one investor can spread an investment, even a small one, across many
companies, sectors, and jurisdictions, as opposed to the ostensibly riskier strategy of
buying entire shares in a single company on a national stock exchange.
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The ensuing accumulation of financial assets via investment funds among
companies and individuals also entailed a shift in the form and practice of elite power,
notably the rise of what I call “legal entrepreneurialism” (Weeks, 2018). In particular, the
rapid growth and complexity of securities capitalism – which is premised on a guiding
ideology of “shareholder value” – has worked in the favor of politically active financial
and legal professionals who were able to exploit the regulatory tensions and fiscal gaps
between the laws of individual nation-states (Harrington, 2016: p. 272). It is in
Luxembourg, as I argue, where these two tendencies have evolved alongside one another:
on the one hand, the emergence of behemoth investment-fund companies with global
reach – on the other, a new brand of “legal entrepreneurialism” practiced by an
internationally connected financial and policy-making elite. For the case of the Grand
Duchy, this union of interests began in the late 1980s and intensified throughout the
1990s and 2000s.

In the beginning
For the full story of accumulation via Luxembourg investment funds, however,
one must look further back, to the mid-1950s. During this time, key players in the Grand
Duchy began to recognize the vast and untapped market for investment funds, a financial
instrument that became popular in the 1920s in the United States. Dörry believes that this
moment represents “a unique conjuncture of local conditions and intentional decision
making [when] a small group of influential individuals in Luxembourg embraced and
exploited the new opportunities of the internationalizing financial markets” (2016: p. 21).
The ensuing cooperation between Luxembourg’s policymakers and foreign executives
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with regards to investment funds was not without precedent; the Grand Duchy, after all,
had prior experience dealing with foreign finance capital after the passage of its
permissive holding-company law in 1929, the so-called “H29” – a structure designed to
bring together, and avoid double taxation on, the sprawling assets of large foreign
economic groups.
Thus, two developments took place concurrently from the mid-1950s to the early
1960s. On the hand, representatives from the growing investment companies, mostly U.S.
in origin, came looking for a European domicile in which their products – funds largely
consisting of blue-chip U.S. stocks and bonds – would be subject to as little tax as
possible. On the other hand, key politicians in Luxembourg sought to attract large EuroAmerican finance-related institutions into the country (see photo 1). It was a marriage of
convenience that would, in the coming decades, prove to be enormously lucrative.
<INSERT PHOTO ONE>

An industry under development
Wasting little time, a select group of local attorneys (avocats d’affaires) began to
alter in piecemeal fashion the H29 holding company with the intention of creating a legal
structure for funds whose administrative domicile would be in Luxembourg. The first
fund to be listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange dates to 1962, after the country’s
regulator approved the marketing of collective investment funds (fonds de placement) in
1959. The driving force behind these efforts, however, was not a Luxembourger but
rather an American. In the 1960s, fund entrepreneur Bernie Cornfeld had made a fortune
selling mutual funds to the tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel stationed in post-
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World War II Europe. As a local securities attorney explained to me, Cornfeld’s
operation, the Geneva-based Investors Overseas Services (IOS), sent thousands of agents
door-to-door in various European countries in an effort to convince small-scale savers to
place their money into funds marketed by the company. Many IOS funds, in turn, used
Luxembourg as an administrative base, meaning that the Grand Duchy was where their
net asset values were calculated and where redemptions of accumulated dividends took
place.
As Cornfeld’s operation grew and grew over the course of the 1960s, increased
scrutiny from regulators and journalists eventually revealed widespread accounting
malfeasance as well as a pyramid-like marketing structure (Cantor, 1970). The eventual
bankruptcy of IOS, in 1972, was a traumatic experience for those working in the
Luxembourg financial center at the time, given the firm’s extensive usage of the country
as a domicile for its funds. As was recalled by a number of my interviewees, the IOS
debacle exposed the limits of the ultra-laissez-faire attitude held at that time by the
country’s officials; a more robust legal and regulatory structure for funds would be
needed, as a senior banker made clear to me over lunch one afternoon (interview, March
2016).3
In the wake of the IOS collapse, Luxembourgish authorities introduced legislation
specific to the funds sector, which until that time had been lightly regulated on the basis
of the more general 1929 law on holding companies (H29). By 1972, investment funds,
which at that time numbered around 60, became subject to the supervision of the
country’s financial regulator. By the mid-1970s, Cornfeld and IOS were finished, but it
was obvious that capital accumulation via securities ownership was here to stay. Rather
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than abandon the funds industry entirely, state and finance elites in Luxembourg merely
redoubled their efforts and waited for more advantageous market and political conditions
to present themselves. Dörry notes, “together with the banks’ top executives and their
widespread international networks, [the country’s] politicians formed a viable growth
coalition of institutional entrepreneurs for Luxembourg’s financial centre, ready to seize
upon the chances of the internationalization of financial markets” (2016: p. 32).
The right conjuncture for investment funds turned out to be not far off. Against
the background of Europe’s deepening market integration via the European Economic
Community (EEC), a working group of local politicians, regulators, and attorneys
became charged with formulating a new legal framework for investment funds, a task that
began in 1980 and was completed three years later. In this legislation, the group resolved
to address the important issues of fund liquidity, asset diversification, and risk
management. By the time this process concluded, Luxembourg’s fellow EEC member
states France and Italy had ended their strict domestic exchange controls and resistance to
the free circulation of financial products, such as investment funds, within the emerging
Single Market then under construction in Western Europe.
This new legal framework dating from 1983 marks the beginning of the rapid
expansion of the Luxembourg investment-funds industry, which continues to this day.
Another senior regulator crowed about the funds working group’s seeming prescience to
Moyse et al.: “This legal framework for the market put us five years ahead of other
countries, and that was immediately reflected in the [sales] figures” (2014: p. 63). As
such, in March of 1988, Luxembourgish officials were well prepared to swiftly
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implement the first EEC directive for investment funds – given the cumbersome name of
“Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities” (UCITS) 4.
Being the first country to offer administrative services for these EEC-wide funds
gave the Luxembourg financial center a decisive competitive advantage in relation to
other countries in the bloc (Dörry, 2016: p. 30). The ensuing rapid growth of
Luxembourg’s low-margin, yet high-volume funds-administration industry followed the
“agglomeration effect” theory cited by Palan et al. with respect to the development of
offshore financial niches in general. They write,
those governments that were able to… provide modern infrastructure
began to attract serious business into their territory. As additional banks
and financial institutions enter the local market, competition intensifies,
raising the reputation of the center for efficiency and competitiveness. In
time, agglomeration economies generate pockets of expertise, and a tax
haven develops a reputation in certain specialized markets (2009: pp. 182–
183).
The robust growth and consolidation of Luxembourg’s funds-administration
sector, along with a raft of new legal requirements at the national and EU levels,
prompted the industry’s practitioners to organize politically and professionalize their
operations. The Luxembourg Fund Industry joined the older Luxembourg Bankers’
Association to form an influential lobbying bloc within the country’s domestic political
scene. Dörry states, “these new forms of organizational power, dominated by key figures
of the financial industry, allowed the associations’ members to direct their influence and
pursue their own commercial interests, often in close alliance with Luxembourg’s ruling
political decision makers” (2016: p. 30). Their immediate objective: to internationalize
the Luxembourg investment fund.
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A European passport
Building on its 1983 domestic law on investment funds, Luxembourg became the
first jurisdiction to implement the EU directive concerning UCITS in 1988 – “beating
even the UK government and the City of London,” as a senior regulator boasted to me
(interview, March 2016). As the financial center’s many boosters often say, that the
Luxembourgish government was able to pass the first UCITS directive before other
countries did is a shining example of what they call the “first-mover advantage.” What
this amounts to is the ability of financial-center representatives to do the bidding of
foreign investment companies as quickly and skillfully as is possible (cf. Dörry, 2015: p.
806). Here is a flavor of this most widespread of sentiments in the financial center:
Our results also confirm the importance granted to the adaptability of its
legislative and regulatory framework. Luxembourg distinguishes itself by
a first-mover advantage where European directives are rapidly transposed
into national law. This allowed Luxembourg to become the first country of
the European Union to apply the regulation on the Undertakings for
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), encouraging
the domiciliation of investment funds as early as 1988 (Walther and
Schultz, 2012: p. 79; emphasis added).
With the UCITS legislation in place, state and financial elites scurried to
accomplish two pressing tasks. First, in order to develop an internationalized funds
industry, it would be necessary to mobilize thousands of qualified accounting, legal, and
financial personnel – many of whom would subsequently become resident expatriates in
Luxembourg, while others joined the ranks of the sizeable frontalier population, working
in the financial center by day yet commuting to homes in France, Belgium, or Germany.
Because the initial UCITS directive also ruled that non-EU-administered funds could not
be sold within this bloc of 27 nations, the result was a rush of managers relocating the
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administrative domicile of their offshore EU-market funds from Jersey and Switzerland
to Luxembourg.
Second, the same state and finance elites promptly set out to market the
Luxembourg UCITS structure abroad – to locales as far-flung as South Korea and Chile –
in the hopes that investment companies from both inside (namely, German and French)
and outside of the European Union (Swiss and U.S.) would begin offering fund products
whose administrative center would be in the Grand Duchy (Dörry, 2015: p. 806). A key
advantage in this regard, according to a senior fund-industry representative with whom I
spoke, is that a Luxembourg UCITS product was designed to have no tax liability5 when
distributing accumulated dividends from its different sub-funds (interview, December
2015). For an offshore financial center such as Luxembourg’s, the sum of these
developments – the presence of a multilingual workforce, the expansion of its “internal”
market to a continent-wide bloc of nations, and a new financial product of EU
provenance – amounted to an enormous boon:
When the EU formulated at the end of the 1980s a European financial
“passport” permitting whichever fund manager based in the bloc to market
his services within the now-[27] nations, Luxembourg stepped into the
void to become the world’s leading center of international mutual funds
(Chavagneux, 2015: p. 184).
Given that the Grand Duchy’s tiny internal market of some 600,000 residents
would be of limited interest to large investment companies, the country’s state and
finance elites implemented the first UCITS directive in as liberal a fashion as possible,
with an eye to the rapid internationalization of the “Luxembourg fund” (Dörry, 2015: p.
806). As was explained to me by a senior industry representative, the funds sectors in the
countries such as the United States, France, and Germany are oriented respectively to
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their large domestic markets, not to international ones. As a result, countries like these
have nation-specific systems in terms of the tax laws, administration structures, and
distribution mechanisms specific for funds (interview, December 2015). Companies
selling Luxembourg funds, in contrast, are able to adapt to the specificities of the
countries in which their products are sold, which all have different laws, currencies, tax
structures, and regulatory frameworks. An example of this flexibility and scope cited to
me by the above industry representative mentioned was a U.S.-equities fund listed in
Singaporean dollars, for distribution in Singapore.
Aggregation and diversification
Counting on the near-complete support of the country’s governing elites, the
Luxembourg investment-funds industry has expanded and matured over time. Since the
late 1980s, the number of investment funds domiciled in Luxembourg has increased to a
scale unprecedented at the global level, to the point whereby the tiny Grand Duchy trails
only the United States in the amount of accumulated assets under administration – which,
at present, totals $4.7 trillion. “Assets under administration” implies that activities such
as domiciliation and registration take place in Luxembourg, though this distinction does
not mean that the fund managers necessarily operate from the Grand Duchy. These
Masters of Finance Capital are likely to be at work in the world’s principal financial
centers such as London, New York, or Tokyo. Luxembourg, by contrast, specializes not
in “front office” fund management, but rather in the “back office” tasks of administration
and the distribution of accumulated assets.
Because registration and domiciliation take place in the Grand Duchy, all issued
funds are eligible for the so-called EU “passport,” meaning that they can be for sale
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anywhere within this bloc of 27 member states. The EU-wide distribution of Luxembourg
funds thus necessitates a detailed understanding of the legal and regulatory environments
for each target country. As such, the technical knowledge provided by specialized and
multilingual attorneys, auditors, and accountants is in high demand. It is perhaps not
surprising then that Luxembourg City is teeming with administrative and white-collar
employees. A senior politician put this into perspective for me: in 1961, there were 90
lawyers in the capital city; now there are over 2,000. Likewise, the colossal Big Four
accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers alone currently employs some 2,000 people in
the Grand Duchy (interview, February 2016).
What do all these employees of the Luxembourg funds industry do exactly? Even
as fund management usually takes place elsewhere, tiny Luxembourg nevertheless
specializes in many of the administrative tasks associated with funds – including
distribution, legal and transfer services, custodianship, auditing, accountancy, oversight,
compliance, and price reporting. These functions mean that the industry employs
thousands of people in Luxembourg, even as outsourcing and technological change have
meant that this number has dipped slightly in recent years. I mention the statistics above
in order to point out a central strategy of Luxembourg’s governing elites: global offshore
financial services have become a robust source of local employment and, as a result,
income-tax revenue for state coffers (Weeks, 2018: pp. 70–76).
Since the Luxembourgish state has long been keener to tax labor as opposed
accumulating capital, it needed to attract large foreign fund companies that could, in turn,
provide employment to locals and subsequently the frontaliers. According to a senior
securities lawyer, “as soon as the ink was dry” on the UCITS directive in 1988, the
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financial-center officials set out to convince foreign fund companies to establish their EU
operations in Luxembourg (interview, March 2016). The first of these, the august New
York-based custodian bank Brown Brothers Harriman (BBH), arrived in 1989 and
quickly developed a brisk business providing services to large U.S. fund companies
selling products in the French, German, Italian, and other European markets. Following
BBH to Luxembourg were other big names in the U.S. funds industry, including Franklin
Templeton, State Street, and BlackRock.
The first entities from within the Luxembourg financial center to offer services to
foreign fund companies were the local banks, including Banque internationale à
Luxembourg and Banque générale du Luxembourg. A division of labor formed: foreign
companies would set up funds in Luxembourg, while the local banks would be
responsible for completing the less-glamorous, though essential administrative tasks:
legal work, accounting, and the calculation of net asset values. The local banks’ modest
capacity, however, was quickly overwhelmed, according to a senior fund administrator
(interview, January 2016). As the industry matured and diversified during the 1990s and
the 2000s, new apparatuses were needed to administer the rapidly growing and
fragmenting global market for investment funds. The industry’s new fund platforms
sought to create a common administrative “back office,” which could be shared by all the
banks and companies offering Luxembourg funds for distribution. The resulting entities,
including EFA and Fundsquare, became responsible for drafting prospectuses and
generating data on the funds’ net asset values and accumulated monies paid as dividends.
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Toward an uncertain future
I conclude this chapter by reverting to the overall theme of the volume: capital
accumulation. At the heart of the economic models found in Luxembourg and other
offshore centers is a tension between two versions of accumulation: financial and
productive. While officials in the Grand Duchy and comparable jurisdictions undoubtedly
prefer the former variety, the resulting financial accumulation can never be completely
divorced from the fates awaiting those producing goods and services globally.
Nevertheless, long-term trends seem to favor Luxembourg and its ilk. Since the
1980s, as regulationists such as Chesnais (2004) show, accumulation via financial
activity has outpaced all homologous processes predicated on industrial production. The
imperatives of “shareholder value” privilege those who own assets, which has prompted a
decisive change in the priorities of managers vis-à-vis the treatment of workers and
research and development. While such developments have resulted in vast capital
accumulation within financial products such as Luxembourg investment funds, their
effect on overall economic growth has nonetheless been negative throughout much of the
Global North (Stockhammer, 2004).
Can the activities of the Luxembourg financial centers of the world continue to
both depress aggregate growth and enrich the owners of capital? Perhaps. In the current
conjuncture, in which securities capitalism and “shareholder value” have become
omnipresent and hegemonic, tout va bien for the Grand Duchy’s investment-funds
industry (see figure 2). Due to the fragmented and increasingly specialized markets for
UCITS and other financial products, the Luxembourg funds-administration sector has
repeatedly shown that it can handle both volume, in terms of the trillions of dollars under
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its purview, and also specialization, as seen in the sheer variety of fund types, investment
strategies, and legal structures on offer.
<INSERT FIGURE TWO>
Others, however, are less certain that the Grand Duchy’s seemingly limitless
accumulation of financial assets will continue. Notwithstanding decades of healthy
growth and commercial success, a number of my interviewees were quick to sound notes
of caution about the industry’s future. Three risks stood out to these pessimists. First,
whereas the European Union used to give member states latitude with regards to how its
directives were passed into national law, current EU protocols have altered this process
and made it far more regimented, both in terms of the directives’ timeline of
implementation and the margin of maneuver of individual countries. With this change in
practice at the EU level, the Luxembourg financial center seems to be on the verge of
losing two of its long-standing competitive advantages: its ability as a “first mover” and
as a regulatory arbitrageur.
The second risk is that the Luxembourg financial center has started to become a
target of the incessant cost-cutting strategies of the large investment-fund companies.
Dörry writes, “Luxembourg is a fund domicile centre, where the functional logic of fund
administration activities essentially follows cost-driven scale economies” (2015: p. 801).
With Europe’s highest GNP per capita, an economy that grows over 4 percent annually,
and a robust labor market in an otherwise economically peripheral part of Western
Europe, Luxembourg is cursed – or blessed, depending on your vantage point – with
housing and commercial real-estate prices that are on par with those in prime areas of
London (Zucman, 2015: pp. 90–91; Weeks In Press). Could the high costs of living and
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doing business drive fund administrators out of the Grand Duchy? Many of my
interlocutors fear so.
Of all things, the reduction of banking secrecy in recent years has been a catalyst
for some of these fragmentary pressures within the funds industry. During the decades in
which the Luxembourg financial center catered to small-time tax fraudsters, dubbed the
“Belgian dentists” (dentistes belges), fund administration had to take place within the
Grand Duchy in order to keep in line with the secrecy laws of 1982 and 1993 (Weeks,
2018) – which required that Luxembourg-based personnel subject to national bankingsecrecy statutes carry out most fund-related activities. Given that banking secrecy has
morphed significantly in the past 10 years, even been curtailed for some foreign
customers, there has been continuing pressure for fund administrators to forego the high
costs of doing business in Luxembourg and outsource tasks to less-expensive EU locales
such as Poland or even “third countries” (pays tiers) such as India.
The third risk is that the Luxembourg investment-funds industry will become a
victim of its own success. At present, financial-center officials have made it exceedingly
easy for foreign managers to set up an offshore investment fund in the Grand Duchy.
However, it is an open question as to whether national regulators have the resources and
expertise to perform due diligence on what are ever-more sophisticated vehicles of
financial accumulation. Jérôme Turquey, a business consultant and one of the few outspoken Luxembourgish critics of finance, believes that the country’s regulatory authority,
the CSSF, neither holds the financial center accountable nor can it escape the many
conflicts of interests generated via its system of “working groups”: “They don’t admit
that they can’t regulate everything,” Turquey says, “These are the people… who decide
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that what the regulation should be. If you look at their financial reports, they say every
time: ‘Everything is perfect. We are the best regulated country on the planet’” (cited in
Shaxson, 2012: p. 362). More ominously, regulators in Luxembourg seem to be lauded
not for being credible and truly independent overseers keeping watch over and regulating
offshore finance, but rather for their role in promoting the very financial center they are
supposed to regulate. In this regard, recent regulatory developments in Luxembourg
mirror those taking place in other offshore financial centers (OFCs): “in recent years
many OFCs have gone to considerable length to create an aura of regulatory
sophistication by enacting a variety of legislative measures. Demand for such measures is
largely driven by the financial sector itself, principally in order to create a veneer of
respectability” (Christensen and Hampton, 1999: p. 168).
In the meantime, however, the Luxembourg investment-funds industry continues
to grow – as it has for the last three decades, save a brief period during the 2008-09
global financial crisis. Its accumulating assets under administration have long exceeded
levels from before the global financial crisis, to the previously inconceivable figure of
over $4.7 trillion (see figure 2) – which is nearly equal to a fifth of the GDP of the United
States. From its beginning as a specialist in the administration of mutual funds and later
UCITS, the Luxembourg financial center has since then diversified into bond funds,
mixed funds, money-market funds, funds-of-funds, and alternative-investment vehicles
such as hedge funds. Dörry writes, “the tightly interwoven, durable architectures of these
professional networks make finance – as The Economist points out – ‘not quite as mobile
as some of its practitioners like to pretend’” (2015: pp. 802–803). In this light, we might
conclude that Luxembourg’s fund administrators will undoubtedly be on hand to shape
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the next phase of worldwide finance capitalism, complete with both the promise and the
misery it will no doubt engender.

1

FIRE entails three sectors central to post-industrial political economies: finance,
insurance, and real estate.
2

To put Luxembourg’s $4.7 trillion in fund assets under administration into context, the
2017 GDP of the United States is $19 trillion. Other than the United States, which counts
approximately $20 trillion in fund assets, and Luxembourg, with its $4.7 trillion, Ireland
is in third place, at $3.1 trillion (Irish Funds, 2020).
3

Such a realization, of course, would not be a surprise to regulation theorists such as
François Chesnais (2004); as they show, emerging regimes of accumulation – in the case
of Luxembourg, one predicated on investment funds – frequently come to be matched
with newfound modes of regulation at level of nation-states.
4

The open-ended UCITS are an EU-wide version of a U.S. mutual fund or a British unit
trust. By design, UCITS are more regulated when compared to riskier types of investment
funds, such as hedge funds, and offer greater protections for investors.
5

Ireland is another EU jurisdiction offering ultra-low tax treatment for investment funds,
yet its fund industry only became significant in the 1990s, as opposed to the 1980s for the
case of Luxembourg’s. This ten-year “head start” for the Grand Duchy can been seen in
the March 2019 assets under administration: $3.1 trillion for Ireland versus $4.7 trillion
for Luxembourg.
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